Asset pricing is a branch of financial economics that is rich in puzzles and anomalies-that is, stylized empirical facts not easily explained by the canonical asset pricing models. These range from the equity premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle to the fact that stock returns are highly predictable. This entry discusses different consumption based asset pricing models that have been developed to resolve these puzzles and it evaluates their empirical performance.
If agents have CRRA (constant relative risk aversion) preferences and if returns and consumption growth are jointly log-normal, then the Sharpe ratio (i.e, the equity premium per unit of risk) can be decomposed as:
where R e is the excess return on stocks over bonds, α is the relative risk aversion (RRA) parameter, and ∆c denotes log consumption growth. The equity premium is about 6 percent in the U.S. data with a standard deviation of 15 percent, producing a Sharpe ratio (E (R e ) /std (R e )) of 0.4. Mehra and Prescott (1985) assume the existence of a representative-agent who consumes the aggregate endowment stream. Rubinstein (1974) and Wilson (1968) derive aggregation results that rely on either complete markets or the absence of idiosyncratic income risk. By appealing to these aggregation results, Mehra and Prescott can use per-capita consumption growth in (1). This series has a standard deviation of less than 2 percent in the postwar U.S. data, and a low correlation with stock returns-less than 0.25 by most estimates. Substituting these values into the expression above implies a lower bound for the relative risk aversion coefficient of 80, which is implausibly high judging by its implications for an individual's choices in other settings. That is the puzzle.
Furthermore, even if one is willing to accept such a high risk aversion, this choice creates different puzzles itself-a point first noted by Weil (1989) .
Risk-free rate puzzle To see this, note that the Euler equation for the risk-free asset choice can be linearized to obtain:
Assume a positive time discount rate (β < 1), and an average consumption growth rate of 1.5 percent per year. Then a risk aversion of 40 would imply an interest rate of nearly 60 percent per year, simply because these households are extremely unwilling to substitute consumption over time. This means they want a flat consumption profile and, to achieve that, they want to transfer more consumption to today. But of course in equilibrium this cannot be done, which simply pushes up the riskfree rate.
The last term in (2) captures the precautionary savings motive. For very high levels of risk aversion, this effect dominates the intertemporal substitution effect, and an increase in the RRA coefficient reduces the risk-free rate. Epstein and Zin (1989) developed a class of recursive preferences that allows for a wedge between the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the coefficient of risk aversion. By giving up on time-separability, we can make progress on the equity premium front by raising the RRA without inflating the riskfree rate.
Models
Against the backdrop of Mehra and Prescott's benchmark model, subsequent papers that attempt to resolve these puzzles can be categorized according to whether they modify (i) the preferences, (ii) the market and asset structure, or (iii) the endowment process. These approaches are now discussed in turn.
The utility function
Recursive Preferences In the case of CCRA utility, the stochastic discount factor (SDF) has the following form:
A drawback of this specification is that it restricts the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) to be the inverse of the RRA parameter. But these two parameters capture conceptually distinct aspects of individuals' preferences. Building on work by Kreps and Porteus (1978) , Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) introduced "recursive preferences" (also called non-expected utility):
where α is still the RRA parameter, but now the EIS is captured by a separate parameter: 1/ (1 − ρ). In this case, the SDF is given by:
where γ = α/ρ, and R M t is the total return on the investors' wealth portfolio (including human capital which must be tradeable for this representation to be derived; see Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1989) . An appealing feature of this SDF is that it combines two components that are each central to separate asset pricing theories: in particular, the SDF is a geometric average of consumption growth and the market return, where the latter is the relevant SDF in the standard capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Moreover, when α = 0 (logarithmic risk preferences), then the CAPM emerges as a special case whereas α = ρ reduces it to the standard case of expected utility. See Epstein and Zin (1989) and Campbell (2000) .
In addition, this preference specification is flexible enough to allow to choose a coefficient of relative risk aversion that is high enough to match the equity premium without being forced to accept a very low EIS. The low EIS is responsible for the risk-free rate puzzle, as explained above. Bansal and Yaron (2004a) exploit this agent's concern for long-run consumption risk by introducing a small predictable component in consumption growth.
Habit formation and Catching-up With the Joneses Another approach, pioneered by Sundaresan (1989) , Abel (1990) and Constantinides (1990) , starts from the following specification of the investor's preferences over consumption streams C t :
where X t is some function of either (i) the individual's own past consumption, or (ii) the past consumption of a reference group, such as an individual's peers, neighbors, or the population as a whole. (Abel (1990) 's specification features the ratio of C t to X t instead of the level difference.) The first approach allows an individual's marginal utility to depend on her own past consumption history. This is commonly referred to as habit formation, endogenous habit, or internal habit. The second interpretation allows an individual's utility to depend on her status relative to her peers, neighbors or the population as a whole. This is referred to as catching-up with the Joneses or as external habit. These preference specifications amplify the effect of consumption growth shocks on the marginal utility growth of investors, in turn generating a high equity premium. See Uhlig (2007) for useful closed-form approximations for the moments of asset prices using a rich external habit specification that includes leisure.
A particularly successful version of the catching-up-with-the-Joneses specification was developed by Campbell and Cochrane (1999) (henceforth CC) who choose the sensitivity of X to consumption growth shocks to match the conditional and unconditional moments of returns. In the baseline CC model, aggregate consumption and dividend growth are i.i.d. Menzly, Santos, and Veronesi (2004) introduce additional cash flow dynamics to explain the time series and cross-section of stock returns, while Santos and Veronesi (2005) emphasize the importance of labor income share variation to understand time variation in risk premia. Wachter (2002) applies a version of the CC model to the term structure, while Verdelhan (2004) uses the same model to explain the forward premium puzzle.
Looks like a habit Several recent papers have proposed models with standard preferences (such as CRRA) but consider economic environments which give rise to SDF's similar to those resulting from external habit preferences (such as the one used in Campbell and Cochrane (1999) ). Examples include work by Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2004) who introduce housing services consumption into this framework, and by Yogo (2006) who considers durable consumption broadly defined, building on earlier work by Dunn and Singleton (1986) and Eichenbaum and Hansen (1990) . Finally, Guvenen (2005) studies a model with limited stock market participation and shows that while the asset pricing implications of his model are similar to those in CC, the implications for macroeconomic questions (such as policy analysis, etc.) are quite different.
Additional arguments in the Utility function The models discussed so far assume that investors only derive utility from non-durable consumption. In exchange economy models (in which the consumption process is exogenous) this is equivalent to assuming that non-durable consumption enters the utility function in a separable manner. Some recent papers explicitly model the utility flow from housing consumption (in a non-separable manner), and find that such an extension improves the asset pricing performance ( see work by Grossman and Laroque (1990) , Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2004) and Flavin and Yamashita (2002) ). Similarly, a labor/leisure choice was introduced by Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) and Danthine and Donaldson (2002) , in a representative agent framework, and by Uhlig (2006) in an incomplete markets framework. However, these authors find that this extension negatively affects the performance of asset pric-ing models, because it allows households to smooth their marginal utility by adjusting on the labor/leasure margin. As a result, one needs to introduce additional-typically labor marketfrictions to counteract this new smoothing opportunity.
Consumption Dynamics
In consumption based asset pricing models, it is common to assume that aggregate consumption growth is i.i.d. over time, because the evidence for consumption growth predictability in the data is weak. In the i.i.d. case, the conditional market price of risk, which can be approximated by the conditional standard deviation of the log SDF, σ t (m t,t+1 ) = α × std (∆c), is constant. Therefore, these models cannot generate any time variation in risk premia on equity or any other asset.
In the context of a standard representative agent model, Kandel and Stambaugh (1990) generate time-variation in risk premia by introducing heteroscedasticity in aggregate consumption growth. Bansal and Yaron (2004b) deviate from the i.i.d. assumption by introducing a small predictable component in consumption growth, that is statistically hard to detect. This long run component increases the market price of consumption risk. In addition, they add some time-variation in the size of the long run risk component. Colacito and Croce (2005) show these long-run risk models can reconcile the low volatility of exchange rate changes with the large market price of risk.
Finally, Longstaff and Piazzesi (2002) argue that corporate earnings are much more risky that aggregate consumption growth, and that this can account for a large share of the equity premium puzzle.
Production Economy Models These asset pricing puzzles have also attracted a lot attention from macroeconomists because the same basic framework used in Mehra and Prescott (1985) also forms the backbone of the Kydland and Prescott (1982) model and the subsequent real business cycle literature. Therefore, understanding why individuals dislike risk in financial markets could help shed light on individuals' perceptions of macro risk and consumption fluctuations, a key question for macroeconomic policy. However, macroeconomists are also interested in the determination of quantities, such as output, investment and consumption, making the exchange economy framework unsuitable for their purposes. Therefore, macroeconomists replace the exogenous endowment stream with the endogenous equilibrium consumption of a standard neoclassical production economy that faces technology shocks. One of the first findings of this approach, summarized in Rouwenhorst (1995) , is that resolving the equity premium puzzle in a production economy is far more challenging than in an exchange economy, because this endogenous consumption process becomes too smooth if one increases risk aversion. As a result, one needs to resort to real frictions such as large adjustment costs in Jermann (1998)'s model. Furthermore, and as noted above, allowing for an endogenous labor supply choice, as is common in macroeconomic analysis, gives the consumers another margin to smooth marginal utility and further reduces the equity premium. Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001) and Uhlig (2006) have successfully introduced labor market frictions to effectively shut down this channel.
Market and Asset Structure
The aggregation results we appeal to in order to use a representative agent in asset pricing depend on market completeness. A natural question is to ask what happens if some of these markets are shut down.
Incomplete Markets To help resolve the equity premium puzzle identified by Hansen and Singleton (1983) and Mehra and Prescott (1985) , uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk has been introduced into standard dynamic general equilibrium models by Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) , Telmer (1993) , Lucas (1994) , Heaton and Lucas (1996) , Krusell and A. Smith (1998) and Marcet and Singleton (1999) , among others. Their main results, obtained numerically for a range of parameter values, suggest that the impact of uninsurable labor income risk on the equity premium is small, because agents manage to smooth consumption quite well by trading a risk-free bond. In fact, Levine and Zame (2002) show that under general conditions the equilibrium allocations and prices in incomplete market economies converge to the complete market counterparts as household become more patient, rendering the incompleteness moot.
So when does imperfect risk sharing matter? Mankiw (1986) derived a sufficient condition for imperfect risk sharing to increase the equity risk premium: the cross-sectional variance of consumption growth needs to increase when returns are low (i.e. in recessions). Constantinides and Duffie (1996) embed this counter-cyclical cross-sectional variance mechanism in a general equilibrium model. Grossman and Shiller (1982) show that the Mankiw-Constantinides-Duffie (MCD) mechanism breaks down in continuous-time diffusion models, because the cross-sectional variance of consumption growth is deterministic. Finally, Krueger and Lustig (2007) show analytically that this MCD mechanism cannot be activated in a general equilibrium model, even with binding solvency constraints and persistent labor income shocks, unless the distribution of labor income shocks itself is countercyclical.
Discussion of other models Rietz (1988) was the first to argue that countries like the US may simply have been very lucky. Hence, the observed history of the U.S. economy may understate the actual probability of economic disasters (at least as perceived by investors) like the Great depression. In this case, the volatility of the SDF may be significantly higher than the one estimated from historical time series. As a result, investors will shun stocks and demand a much higher equity premium to hold them. One difficulty with this explanation is that many economic disasters also result in the government reneging on their debt obligations. Barro (2007) extends Rietz's framework by distinguishing between two types of disasters-those that only affect the stock market and those that affect all asset markets-and explores the empirical implications of this mechanism in recent work.
